The Effects of Management and Provision Accounts on Hedge Fund Returns A characteristic of hedge funds is not only an active portfolio management, but also the allocation of portfolio performance between different accounts, which are the accounts for the external investors, an account for the management firm and a provision account. Despite a lack of transparency in hedge fund market, the strategy of performance allocation is publicly available. This paper shows that these complex performance allocation strategies might explain stylized facts observed in hedge fund returns, such as return persistence, skewed return distribution, bias ratio, or implied increasing risk appetite.
crum fees are centered around an index 3 and have upper and lower limits in size. Such constraints do not exist for HF.
In Section 2, we provide three examples of allocations between accounts used in practice.
We first consider two rather standard high-water mark (HWM) and loss carry forward (LCF) schemes with class A and B accounts only. Then, we present a scheme with also a provision account, introduced to produce more marketable HF returns. The presence of several accounts can imply significant differences between the return of the managed porfolio and the published HF return, which usually corresponds to the return of class A account only. We describe in detail the nonlinear filter to pass from the portfolio return to the published HF return.
Section 3 compares the portfolio and account A returns for the different allocation schemes, when the portfolio returns are independent and identically Gaussian distributed. The i.i.d.
Gaussian assumption on portfolio returns corresponds to a rather exogenous portfolio management, whereas the hedge fund manager will account for the existence of multiple accounts in his/her management strategy. In Section 4, we discuss the mean-variance efficient portfolio management according to the account of interest. If the performance of account A has to be maximized, the management differs from the standard mean-variance management of the global portfolio. More precisely, the selected scheme of allocation between accounts has a significant impact on the optimal portfolio management. There exists a theoretical literature in the introduction of multiple accounts as an incentive for the hedge fund manager 4 . However, this question is often considered under rather irrealistic assumptions such as continuous time incentives, whereas the barrier effects apply monthly [see e.g. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Ross (2003) , Kouwenberg, Ziemba (2007) 4 There exists also a more empirical literature studying the links between the risk taken by the hedge fund manager, often summarized by means of the HF return volatility, and some characteristics of the HF, such as proxies for the optional feature of the compensation scheme [see e.g. Kazemi, Li (2009) ]. These analysis are often based on the rather simple static linear regression techniques and thus neglect the complexity of the compensation scheme, especially its dynamics and nonlinear features.
rather ad-hoc account description, which does not correspond to the account allocations proposed in the hedge fund industry [Aragon, Nanda (2009) 
Allocation Between Accounts
There exist almost as many account allocation schemes as hedge funds shares, which explains why any precautionary investor, regulator, or researcher 5 should study in details the prospectus of the funds. We describe below three schemes. The two first ones, rather standard, describe the performance allocation between the account invested by external clients, called class A units, and the account invested by the management firm, called class B units. The third process includes also a provision account used to smooth the performance of class A account. This latter account was initially introduced for taxation reasons.
To simplify, we assume that there is neither redemption, nor subscription after the inception date and no misreporting of the data. The changes observed in the values of the different accounts come from the evolution of the portfolio return only.
High-Water Mark allocation scheme
We describe in this section the core of the standard allocation scheme used by a large proportion of hedge funds. This allocation scheme is parametrized by an allocation rate, called performance fee rate, a return benchmark, called hurdle rate, and a validity period corresponding to the duration between consecutive resets of class B account. These parameters differ according to the fund share.
(a) Allocation between A and B accounts
Let us first consider two accounts, with respective values A t , B t at month t, t = 0, ..., T [see Table 1 ].
[Insert The contractual hurdle rate is denoted by y h,t , y h,t ≥ 0, and is assumed to be predetermined and observable. The contractual hurdle rate is a benchmark introduced to define the performance allocations. This hurdle can be set to zero [see e.g. Panageas The hurdle rate has to be defined in the same currency as the fund reference currency, e.g. US Dollar, Euro, Yen, ... The maximal value reached on the past by account A is discounted at rate y h,t and called the high-water mark (HWM). The HWM is defined by: This HWM level will apply to date t + 1, it is endogenous 6 , since the fee schedule is function of past successes, but is predetermined, due to the choice of the predetermined hurdle rate. We deduce that:
2)
At period t, the global portfolio value A t + B t is invested and provides at the end of the period a return net of base management fees 7 denoted by y t+1 . Then, the change in total portfolio value (A t + B t )y t+1 is allocated between the two accounts. The performance fee is not charged if the fund is globally in a deficit of performance with respect to the high-water mark. Thus, this allocation depends on the location of:
with respect to the predetermined HW M t as follows:
6 Exogenous HWM of the type HW M t = HW M 0
(1 + y h,τ ) are often assumed in the HF literature [see e.g. Hodder, Jackwerth (2003) ]. Such HWM schemes correspond to the fulcrum scheme for mutual funds, but are very different from the actual HWM for hedge funds. 7 The base management fee is generally proportional to the asset value managed by the fund. Without loss of generality, we take them into account by considering portfolio return net of base management fee. The updating equations (2.4)-(2.5) can also be written as: 6) where X + = max(X, 0), to highlight the presence of an option component. When the fund gains enough value, the manager is paid and the strike price increases, but when the fund loses money, the strike price remains unchanged and the manager retains his/her option at the old strike price. For a zero hurdle rate, the recursive equation for account A can also be written as:
If HW M
which shows that the fund manager receives a fraction of the increase in HWM as conpensation.
In practice, the management firm is periodically paid by means of the management account, generally at the end of the year. The recursive equations are valid on a period {0, T − 1} of a given length T corresponding to the duration between consecutive resets, i.e. 0 and T . At time T , the management account is reset to the initial fixed 9 contractual value B 0 and the HWM reset 10 to A T (1 + y h,T ). Since the allocation scheme may create nonstationary features, this practice breaks down possible explosive behavior.
If the reset time is T = 1, the HWM is equal to A t (1 + y t+1 ) and regimes (2.4) and (2.5) are active depending if the portfolio management out-or underperforms the hurdle. We get y 0,t = y h,t and the HWM disappears in equation (2.6) that becomes: 8) and is reset at each date. In this setup a fixed proportion α of the return above the hurdle is allocated to class B at each period, which corresponds to a standard fulcrum scheme.
To summarize, the evolutions of account values depend on the portfolio management, that is, the sequence of portfolio returns (y t ), and on the allocation design characterized by hurdle rate (y h,t ), performance fee rate α, and reset time 11 T . The dynamic system is recursive, since value (A t ) has an autonomous dynamic, and value (B t ) is fixed later. Let us finally remark that the value of account A can decrease and even become smaller than the initial value A 0 , or negative. Therefore, the HF can fail 12 before the contractual reset time
T . We will consider in the theoretical analysis that the fund fails if A t becomes negative before reset time. From equation (2.6), we see that the portfolio return is necessarily larger than −1 before the potential failure time, and account B is positive. From this theoretical point of view, fund failure arises as the consequence of an abnormal negative return. In practice, it is also possible that the fund manager decides to liquidate the fund if the losses on account A are too large, even if A t is still positive, or if his/her fees B t are too small. 9 That is, this contractual value is not discounted. 10 There exist funds with different reset times for the HWM and the B account. 11 It is important to distinguish the reset time and the termination date of an hedge fund. Whereas most hedge fund management contracts do not have a pre-specified termination date, a reset time is often indicated. The presence of a reset time has significant implications on fund management and returns, and has to be taken into account. By implicitely assuming an infinite reset time, a part of the literature considered rather unrealistic models [see e.g. Panageas, Westerfield (2009)]. Typically, in a continuous time framework, the reset time will imply jumps of an endogenous size at predetermined dates.
12 A HF fails when the fund manager decides to liquidate the fund and gives back the remaining asset under management to investors. The decision for liquidation is not contractual, but is at the discretion of the fund manager. The dependence of ∆A t+1 = A t+1 − A t (resp. ∆B t+1 = B t+1 − B t ) with respect to net porfolio return y t+1 is described in Figure 1 (resp. Figure 2 ). Let us also discuss this scheme if the fund manager invests only in a riskfree asset, y t+1 = y f,t , with a riskfree return larger than the hurdle, y f,t ≥ y h,t , say 13 . Since A t (1 + y f,t ) ≥ A t (1 + y h,t ) = HW M t , the fund manager would profit systematically of such a static riskfree investment. Surprisingly, this account allocation scheme is often used in the HF industry with a zero hurdle rate y h,t = 0.
(c) The returns and effective performance fees A major point in the discussion of fund returns is the definition of returns in case of several accounts. Indeed, the following returns can be introduced: i) the total portfolio net return y t+1 , ii) the return on B account 14 
The fund returns available in the standard Hedge Funds Research (HFR) or Lipper-Tass databases are returns (y A,t ) corresponding to class A units. They can feature dynamics very different from the dynamics of (y t ) and (y B,t ). For instance, return y A,t is always smaller or equal to the total net porfolio return y t . It coincides with it at some endogeneous periods, and is strictly below, otherwise. It can be important in analysis to distinguish the reported HF return y A,t and the underlying total portfolio return y t . As an illustration, the methodology proposed in Henriksson, Merton (1981) [see also Glosten, Jagannathan This might explain why "this option like payoff (effect) is not restricted only to trend followers and risk arbitrageurs, but is a feature on a wide range of hedge funds strategies" [Agarwal, Naik (2004) The ex-post performance allocation rate, i.e.:
is not constant in time, can be erratic and rather different from the announced rate α.
An effective performance allocation rate can be computed on a larger period to smooth the α t s, for instance on the period [0, T ] corresponding to the time between resets. This effective performance allocation is: 10) and can also be different from α even for large T . Rateα T is likely strictly larger than α, since the total loss is assigned to account A, when the portfolio underperforms. It can even be larger due to the nonlinear allocation filtering which can create a convexity effect (see Appendix 1).
The Loss Carry Forward allocation scheme
As in the previous subsection, this allocation scheme is parametrized by a performance fee rate α, a hurdle rate y h,t , and a reset time T . The difference is the definition of the predetermined path dependent strike.
(a) Allocation between A and B accounts
At period t, the global portfolio value A t + B t is invested and provides at the end of the period a return net of base management fee y t+1 . The change in total portfolio value (A t + B t )y t+1 is allocated between the two accounts. As in the HWM framework, the performance fee is not charged if the fund is globally in a deficit of performance, called loss carry forward 17 (LCF). This measure of deficit is recursively defined by LCF 0 = 0 and:
where X − = max(−X, 0). The LCF is always nonpositive and corresponds to the cumulated negative performance. The LCF t becomes negative iff y t is not large enough to cover (potential) previous losses.
Then, the allocation depends on LCF and is driven by the following updating equations:
At short term horizon equal to 1, the future account values involve the payoff of a European call written on y t+1 , with predetermined path dependent strike equal to y 0,t = (
The recursive equations are valid on period {0, T −1}. At time T , the management account is reset to the contractual initial value B 0 and the LCF reset to zero.
If the reset time is T = 1, the LCF is always set to zero, y 0,t = y h,t , and equation (2.13) becomes:
that corresponds to system (2.8). Therefore, the HWM and LCF schemes are equivalent in this special case and equivalent to the fulcrum scheme.
(b) The case of a zero hurdle rate
The proposition below highlights an additional link between the HWM and LCF schemes.
Proposition 1:
The HWM and LCF schemes are identical for zero hurdle rate, with
Proof: see Appendix 2.
For a nonzero hurdle rate, the HWM and LCF approaches differ by their discounting
Proposition 2: For zero hurdle rate, there exists a one-to-one relationship between the trajectories of y t and y A,t . More precisely, we can deduce the underlying portfolio return as a deterministic function:
Proof: By the transformation in Figure 1 , we have:
and by recursive substitution:
where b * is one-to-one in the first argument y t . Thus, by introducing return y A,t , we deduce the formula of Proposition 2. QED Thus we are able to derive the underlying portfolio return from the return of account A by simply inverting the filter which defines the accounts allocation. Even if the data on portfolio return are not made directly observable by the fund manager, we can recursively reconstruct them. Of course the relation between y t and y A,t is not static, and no deterministic link of the type y t = g * (y A,t ), say, will be detected by a joint plot of (y t , y A,t ).
When the hurdle rate is nonzero, we still have a one-to-one relationship conditional on the knowledge of the hurdle rate history, that is,
An allocation scheme with provision account
More sophisticated allocation scheme can include a third account, called provision account 18 , used to make more marketable the published HF returns (y A,t ). This scheme involves additional allocation parameters characterizing the allocation performance rates between the provision account and account A.
(a) Allocation between A, B and C accounts
Let us now consider three accounts, with respective values A t , B t and C t at month t, Table 2 ].
[Insert At period t, the global portfolio value A t + B t + C t is invested and provides at the end of the period a return net of base management fees denoted by y t+1 . Then, the change in total portfolio value is (A t + B t + C t )y t+1 . Since the return on class B is always allocated to the corresponding class, we only consider how (A t +C t )y t+1 has to be allocated between the three accounts depending on some predetermined regimes.
We consider below an allocation process based on a modified LCF measure of performance deficit. In this case, the LCF can be interpreted as the negative part of a virtual provision account (whereas the value of the actual provision account has to be always positive).
Hence, at any date t, the sum LCF t + C t is only impacted by one of its two components, the other one being zero. The LCF starts to be negative when the provision account is empty. For expository purpose, the allocation scheme is described below in two steps to highlight the smoothing technique.
i) Three accounts -no smoothing
A proportion β of the capital appreciation/depreciation up to the hurdle rate, that is
, is allocated to the provision account, under the positivity constraint on this account. The loss carry forward is defined by: 15) and the corresponding provision account value is: 
By construction, the provision account value [resp. the LCF] is always nonnegative [resp. nonpositive]. Moreover, only one of the LCF and C value can be different from zero at any given date.
When C t = 0, equation (2.15) reduces to the standard LCF recursive equation (2.11).
When C t > 0 (and LCF t = 0), a capital appreciation (A t + C t )(y t+1 − y h,t ) > 0 will increase the value of the provision account, whereas the LCF will stay equal to zero. Finally, if C t > 0 and there is a large capital depreciation up to the hurdle rate, the provision account is set to zero and the complete return allocated to account A.
ii) Three accounts with smoothing
The recursive system becomes: 18) for the LCF, 19) for the provision account, and: A simple scheme assumes constant smoothing functions ϕ A (y) = ϕ A , ϕ B (y) = ϕ B , say.
For instance, if ϕ A and ϕ B are such that ϕ A +ϕ B = 1, and if moreover β = 1, the provision account is always empty, and the scheme reduces to the standard LCF scheme with two accounts described in Section 2.2.
However, more sophiticated smoothing functions are introduced in the hedge fund industry. For instance, we can fix a predetermined level 19 y 0,t < 0, and define the smoothing functions as:
, and a full use of the provision account to smooth A (and B) return. If y 0,t < y t+1 < 0, we have a partial smoothing.
Finally, if y t+1 > 0, we get ϕ A (y t+1 ) = ϕ B (y t+1 ) = 0 and the previous account is feeded to insure the fund against future potential losses. 19 For example, y 0,t is set to −1% to smooth small negative returns.
(b) Returns and Asset Values
By analogy with the standard scheme, we can consider different returns. The most important ones are:
i) The total net return: y t+1 ;
ii) The return for class A:
iii) The return associated with both accounts A and C:
Indeed, it is important to distinguish the net asset value (NAV) for class A, i.e. A t , and the value including also the provision account, i.e. A t + C t . The asset value A t is provided for at least two purposes. This is the accounting value, which is introduced by the investors in their balance sheet. This is also the benchmark for the selling price proposed by the fund management to an investor who want to redeem its investment. This NAV A t is a kind of bid price, which is smaller or equal to the "fair value" of the fund equal to A t + C t .
Clearly, the provision account will create a "conditional return smoothing" when passing from y t to y A t , to follow the terminology of Bollen, Pool (2008). However, this (known) smoothing is much more complicated than usually described in the academic literature 3 The effects of the scheme on i.i.d. Gaussian portfolio returns
In this section, we assume a zero riskfree rate, a zero hurdle rate y h,t = 0, and i.i.d.
Gaussian net portfolio returns y t ∼ N (m, σ 2 ), where m (resp. σ 2 ) is the path-independent expected return (resp. volatility). Thus, we assume a constant hedge fund leverage ratio 
The High-Water Mark allocation scheme
In the standard scheme with zero hurdle, the joint dynamics of Class A value and highwater mark is characterized by the bivariate recursive system: 
where (.) denotes a point mass, ϕ the pdf of the standard normal distribution and ⊗ the tensor product.
To illustrate the consequences of the allocation scheme on accounts returns, let us consider risky returns following a Gaussian distribution with mean m = 1%, and volatility σ = 3.46%. We set the performance fee rate at α = 20%. The initial values of the accounts are A 0 = 100, B 0 = 10 and the reset time is set to T = 72 months= 6 years.
We display in Figure 3 the trajectories of the two account values, the HWM, the implied Due to the selected performance fee rate of the portfolio management, the two account values are increasing, but this increase is larger for the management account than for the investor's account. We also observe that the ratio w t is decreasing in time and clearly different from the announced 1 − α = 80%.
[Insert Figure 4 : Return Dynamics]
The return dynamics for y t , y A,t , y B,t are given in Figure 4 . The return on management account is much more volatile than the underlying portfolio return and we observe the 20 Note that yt+1 > y0,t, iff At+1 > HW Mt. The smoothed historical distributions of y t and y A,t are given in the first panel of Figure 5 and the histogram of y A,t in the second panel. The presence of the management account explains the negative drift observed when passing from a positive portfolio return y t to account A return. Indeed, the left part of the distribution is not impacted by the allocation scheme, whereas the right part is. The probability to observe high return is lower; the return distribution becomes more concentrated and skewed.
The nonlinear autoregressive effect due to the HWM barrier is difficult to detect from a standard linear analysis of serial dependence, but also from an analysis of the linear dependence between squared returns [see Figure 6 ]. We observe a cycle effect in both autocorrelograms 22 , which is just significant. [Insert Table 3 : Statistics on y A (T )] 21 It could be rather misleading to analyse the correlation between both returns in this dynamic framework. For instance, for a unitary reset time, we would have yA,t = yt − αy + t . We see immediately that the conditional correlation between y A,t and y t for "small" return y A,t < 0 [resp. "large" return y A,t > 0] is equal to 1 [resp. 1], whereas the unconditional correlation between the returns is positive, but significantly smaller than 1, with a value function of α. 22 This is a consequence of the threshold autoregressive effects in the HWM dynamics [see Tong (1983) ]. Table 3 provides (1 + y t ) − 1 . For horizon T = 1, this return is no longer Gaussian and a convexity effect appears in the computation of the mean and the variance.
For instance, we get:
for small mean m, and:
for small m, σ of a same magnitude. The convexity effects on these moments and the associated Sharpe ratio can be checked on all rows of Table 3 corresponding to α = 0.
As expected from the design of management fees, the return distribution is shifted to the left. Thus, the mean, median and quantiles diminish when α increases. There is also a diminution of risk, since this distribution becomes more concentrated as observed on the values of the standard deviation and kurtosis. Finally, the distribution is right skewed for α = 0, due to the convexity effect describe above, but the skewness diminishes when α increases due to the option interpretation of the HW M .
The Loss Carry Forward allocation scheme
From Proposition 1, we know that the LCF scheme is identical to the HWM scheme for a zero hurdle rate. The associated LCF * = LCF trajectory is given in the fourth panel of Figure 3 .
[Insert 
The allocation scheme with provision account
We display in Figure 7 the trajectories of the three accounts A, B, C, and the LCF. We consider independent risky returns following a Gaussian distribution with mean m = 1%, and variance σ 2 = 1%, set the provision rate at β = 25%, and use the smoothing functions The return dynamics for y t , y A,t , y B,t are provided in Figure 8 . We observe that the presence of a provision account smooths the investor's account return.
[Insert Figure 8: Return Dynamics]
As in the HWM allocation scheme, the return dynamics can be summarized in different ways. First, we compare the historical distributions of returns y t and y A,t in Figure 9 . In presence of a provision account, the two sides of the distribution are modified. The left side (corresponding to negative return) is moved to the right, that is, we get less negative returns, especially around zero. Moreover, the right part is also impacted, due to the smoothing rule used in this simulation. The high positive returns are less frequent, but the probability to observe small positive returns increases. Thus, the provision account implies right skewness and discontinuity on the return distribution, which is clearly seen on the histogram provided in the second panel of Figure 9 . The discontinuity is less pronounced with return computed on two consecutive periods (3 d panel of Figure 9 ), which is compati- Let us now compare the characteristic of HF returns y A,t+1 , for different values of the provision rate β assigned to account C, β = 0%, 5%, 10%, 20%; the limiting case β = 0% corresponds to y A,t+1 = y t+1 . All other parameters are set to the values used to compute Table 4 .
[Insert Table 5 
: Statistics on y A (T )]
23 A linear analysis of serial correlation can also be rather misleading. Indeed conditional serial correlations can be very different. For instance, it is equal to zero when y A,t is sufficiently large, since y A,t = y t , but will become significant when yA,t is small, due to the effect of the optional component which depends on the past. These different levels of conditional serial correlations are just consequences of the HWM schemes, not necessarily a "manager smoothing more likely losses than gains" [Bollen, Pool (2008) 
, (2009)].
We observe that the distribution is shifted to the left when the β parameter increases, but this shift is less pronounced than in the scheme without provision account. Moreover, the risk parameters also diminish when the β parameter increases. In consequence, the Sharpe ratio is stable, and then is less sensitive to the management fee politics. This was not the case in Table 3 . The skewness and kurtosis parameters also decrease with β.
Endogeneous portfolio management
By considering i.i.d. Gaussian portfolio return in Section 3, we have implicitely assumed that the portfolio manager was investing in a kind of market portfolio, and in particular that his/her management strategy does not account for the existence of multiple accounts.
The aim of this section is to discuss how the dynamics of account returns is modified with an endogenous investment strategy. In practice, the fund manager will account for an incentive mix such as reporting of good investor's performance, benefiting from the HWM or LCF effect on the management account, and controlling the risk of fund closure. In this section, we focus on mean-variance myopic strategies without taking into account the risk of fund closure. The strategies differ by the account value which is chosen as the main target. We consider the case of unitary reset times, where explicit strategies can be derived and analysed.
For illustration, let us assume that the fund manager invests only in a riskfree asset with zero riskfree rate and in a risky asset with i.i.d. Gaussian returns 24 , denoted by y * t . With unitary reset time and the hurdle rate equal to the riskfree rate y h,t = y f,t = 0, the allocation between A and B accounts is given by (2.8):
where y t+1 is the portfolio return. Let us now consider the portfolio allocation at date t.
The total budget is allocated between the two assets: W t = A t + B t = a 0,t + a t , where a 0,t (resp. a t ) is the value invested in the riskfree asset (resp. risky asset). At date t + 1, the portfolio value becomes:
We deduce the portfolio return as:
where δ t = a t /(A t + B t ) denotes the fraction invested in risky asset. By substitution in (4.1), we get:
and
Let us now consider a myopic mean-variance investor 25 , with absolute risk aversion 26 η.
The optimal allocation depends on the account he/she is interested in.
i) If the account of interest is the total account A + B, the optimal allocation is the standard mean-variance efficient allocation [Markovitz (1952)] given by:
Under the i.i.d. Gaussian assumption, the value invested in the risky asset is time dependent. As usual, the portfolio manager is proportionally investing less in risky asset, when
If the account of interest is account B, the efficient allocation becomes: 6) where γ t = A t /B t . As expected, the allocation is different from the standard allocation δ * t . It changes in time due to the evolution of both accounts (A t , B t ). Moreover, the ratio between this allocation and the standard one shows a double effect: the effect of portfolio size, which diminishes from A t + B t to B t and implies an increase of the quantity invested in the risky asset; the effect of the optional component depends on time and tail distribution of the underlying return. The global effects is unclear.
For instance, if γ t is large, the investment in risky asset will become very small. Contrary to a usual belief, it is not granted that giving an option to the fund manager makes him/her willing to take risk, even if he/she focus on the management account. This is compatible with the recent literature on incentives, in which several authors arrive to similar conclusions for instance by changing the utility function [Ross(2004) in the fund, this will inhibit excessive risk taking" [Fung, Hsieh (1999) ]". This can lead to surprising consequences: for instance, at initial date 0, a small value of B 0 can be an incentive to take risk at the beginning; equivalently, introducing more frequent reset times with rather small B 0 can be an incentive to take risk regularly (ceteris paribus, i.e. for fixed gamma).
In addition to this size effect, there is the optional feature since account B is a portfolio in the underlying asset and a call written on this asset. As noted in Hodder, Jackwerth (2007), this "generates risk-taking below the HWM, when the manager tries to assure that his/her incentive option will finish in the money". But "at performance levels modestly above the HWM, he/she reverses that strategy and opts for very low risk positions to lock in the option payoff".
iii) If the account of interest is account A, the efficient allocation is:
This allocation depends on the evolution of account A only. The change in account value is: In practice, it is difficult to know what is really the criterion selected by the fund manager. This is likely a mix, which takes into account his/her individual wealth, that is account B, and probably a fraction of account A. But he/she has also to account for the rankings of fund managers, which are regularly published in the press, and are a strong incentive for considering the preferences of fund investors 27 . To illustrate the consequences of these portfolio managements on accounts returns, we consider risky returns following a Gaussian distribution with mean m = 1%, and volatility σ = 3.46%. We set the performance fee rate at α = 25%, with unitary reset time and the absolute risk aversion However, the myopic mean-variance behaviour are not sufficient to create highly significant short term correlation on returns as shown on Figure 13 . The serial correlation, which can be observed on real data, are more likely due to either the nonlinear dynamics of the basic assets introduced in the portfolio, or a non myopic, intertemporal portfolio management. In this respect, it could be interesting to reproduce the same simulation exercice with a market return conditionally Gaussian, but including an ARCH effect. Indeed, this volatility effect could create linear serial correlation after passing by the nonlinear filter of HWM and provision account.
[Insert Figure 13 : ACF on Return]
Conclusion
The selected schemes for allocating gains and profits between the investor's account, management account and provision account have a significant impact on the performance of the investor's account. This effect is twofold. There is a direct effect on account A return due to the nonlinear scheme, especially the barrier effects including HWM and the smoothing introduced by the provision account. There is an additional indirect effect, when the fund manager ajusts his/her portfolio management to this scheme. We have presented in this paper the core schemes used in the hedge fund industry and discussed their effects on the performances. These effects explain a part of the stylized facts observed on hedge fund returns, such as the skewness of the return distribution, it discontinuity at zero, or some cyclical serial correlation. They are not sufficient to explain some observed short term persistence of performance. The special type of nonlinearity involved in these schemes can also lead to misleading interpretations for the analysis using thresholds effect, such as the study of market timing ability, or the comparison of unconditional correlations with correlations restricted to period of poor (or large) performances.
The hedge fund industry is known for its lack of transparency. Surprisingly, a lot of information is available in the prospectus of a fund, especially the scheme of allocation between the different accounts. A wise investor should analyse the consequences of these schemes on the performance of his own account before any investment in hedge funds. Similarly, it is important to take into account these schemes in the academic study of HF returns and of the behaviour of HF portfolio managers. In other terms, we have to correct the results for the management account bias and the provision account bias, and these corrections will differ due to the variability of schemes followed by individual hedge funds.
Appendix 1
Long term analysis of allocation scheme (2.8)
In scheme (2.8), the dynamics of A account does not depend on the periodic reset of B account. The NAV dynamics can be written as:
and (A t ) is an autoregressive process with stochastic autoregressive coefficient. Let us assume y h,t = 0, and i.i.d. portfolio returns, with y t > −1/(1 − α). We can write:
Following the approach used in Nelson (1990) , Bougerol, Picard (1992), we can determine the Lyapunov exponent of process (A t ) as follows. We have: 5) for large t, by the Law of Large Number. Thus, the long term return on class A account is:
Since log(1 + x) ≤ x, we note that:
As expected, this rate is strictly smaller than the long term rate on the portfolio crudely adjusted for performance rate α, i.e. (1 − α)Ey t . It can also be significantly smaller than
, with a difference which increases with the variability on (y t ).
Proof of Proposition 1
i) Let us first consider the HWM scheme and denote by LCF * t = A t − HW M t the implied LCF associated with this scheme. The recursion for the HWM scheme is:
We get the two following regimes:
• Regime 1: LCF * t + A t y t+1 > 0, with:
Then:
We deduce that:
• Regime 2: LCF * t + A 1 y t+1 < 0. We get:
Thus, LCF * t + A t+1 − A t = LCF * t + A t y t+1 < 0, and we deduce that:
ii) Let us now consider the recursion for the LCF scheme:
• Regime 2: LCF t + A t y t+1 < 0,
The recursive equations (2.1)−(2.4) are identical to the equations (2.5)−(2.6). Proposition 1 follows by noting that the initial values of the LCF and implied LCF are the same: 
i) First-Order Moments
We have: 
Therefore, all second-order moments are directly deduced from the quantity
We get:
We deduce: 
